Telford Lands LLC v. Cain Appellant\u27s Brief 2 Dckt. 39466 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-17-2012
Telford Lands LLC v. Cain Appellant's Brief 2 Dckt.
39466
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation




























IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TELFORD LANDS LLC, an Idaho ) 
Limited liability company, MITCHELL D. ) 
SORENSEN, an individual, and PU ) 






DONALD WILLIAM CAIN and ) 
CAROL YN RUTH CAIN, husband and ) 
wife, and JOHN DOES 1-20, individuals, ) 




Supreme Court Docket No. 39466-2011 
Butte County Case No. CV 2010-64 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State ofIdaho, in and for Butte County 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, Presiding 
Gary D. Slette 
ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1906 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1906 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Robert L. Harris 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, PLLC 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, lD 83405-0130 
Attorneys for Respondents 
(£f • 22012 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................. 1 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE ................................................................................................ 1 
B. THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS ...................................................................... 1 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ...................................................................................... 3 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL .......................................................................................................... 12 
III. ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................... 13 
A. Were the Cains denied due process of law as a result of the Ranchers 
taking an interest in the Cains' property without complying with Idaho law, 
and before just compensation was ascertained and paid in the manner 
provided by law? ........................................................................................................ 13 
B. Did the Ranchers create their own alleged necessity by agreeing to 
voluntarily terminate the GW Transport Agreements for the conveyance 
of certain of their water rights? ................................................................................. 17 
C. Did the Ranchers' actions of placing their pipeline across the Cains' property 
without compliance with relevant Idaho statutes constitute a trespass? ................... 36 
D. If the Ranchers' property, and their water rights, were fully developed 
prior to the time of the pipeline installation on the Cains' property, 
were the Ranchers entitled to exercise the private right of eminent domain? .......... 40 
E. Was the Ranchers' Complaint facially deficient under the provisions of 
Title 7 of the Idaho Code for multiple reasons, including its failure to 
specifically describe the easement claimed by the Ranchers? .............................. .41 
F. Did the district court err in failing to dismiss Telford Lands, LLC as a 
hi 1·· . ? 43 party to t s ItlgatIon ............................................................................................... .. 
G. Was it an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court to deny costs 
and attorney fees to the Cains by applying only a prevailing party analysis? ........ 47 
H. Should the Cains be awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
1.A.R Rules 40 and 41, Idaho Code § 12-121, and applicable Idaho case 
law, including Ada County Highway District v. Acarregui, 105 Idaho 873, 
673 P.2d 1067 (1983) and Erickson v. Amoth, 112 Idaho 1122, 739 P.2d 
421 (App. 1987)? ................................................................................................... 51 
IV. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 54 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Ada Co. Highway District v. Acarregui, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983) .,. 12, 47, 51, 53 
Ada Co. Highway District v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888,26 P.3d 1225 (App. 2001) ..................... .41 
Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390,210 PJd 75 (2009) ................................................. .23 
Canyon View Irrigation Co., v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604,607, 
619 P.2d 122, 125 (1980) ................................................................................................... 15,40 
Citibank, (South Dakota), NA. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254, 220 PJd 1073 (2009) ................ .44 
Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266, 215 P.2d 812 (1950) ........................................................ 27 
Erickson v. Amoth, 99 Idaho 907, 591 P.2d 1074 (1978) ............................ 22,27, 29, 31, 34 
Erickson v. Amoth, 112 Idaho 1122,739 P.2d 421 (App. 1987) ............. 12,28,47,50,51,53 
Everett v. Trunnell, 105 Idaho 787, 673 P.2d 387 (1983) ....................................................... 51 
Idaho Power Co. v. Lettunich, 100 Idaho 582, 582-3, 602 P.2d 540 (1979) ......................... 27 
JMF Trucking, Inc. v. Carburetor and Electric o/Lewiston, Inc., 113 Idaho 797, 799, 
748 P.2d 381 (1987) .................................................................................................................. 48 
Marshall v. Niagra Springs Orchard Co., Ltd, 22 Idaho 144, 125 P. 208 (1912) ................... 38 
Matter o/Permit No. 47-7680 ............................................................................................. 20,21 
Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536, 96 P.3d 637 (2004) ........................... 36 
Ryan v. Weiser Valley Land & Water Co., 20 Idaho 288,118 P. 769 (1911) ........................... 36 
State v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318, 940 P.2d 1137 (1997) .......................................................... 53 
State v. Bair, 83 Idaho 475, 365 P.2d 216 (1961) .................................................................. ..42 
Swankv. Sweetwater Irrigation & Power Co., Ltd, 15 Idaho 353,360,98 P. 297 (1908) ..... 38 
STATUTES 
Article I, § 14, Idaho Constitution ..................................................................................... 13,53 
Idaho Appellate Rules, 40 .................................................................................................. 12,51 
Idaho Appellate Rules, 41 .................................................................................................. 12, 51 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(B) ............................................................................. .47 
Idaho Code § 7-702(2) ............................................................................................................... 41 
Idaho Code § 7-704(2) ............................................................................................................... 43 
Idaho Code § 7-707(5) ........................................................................................................... 3, 41 
11 
Idaho Code § 7-707(7) ........................................................................................................ 15,42 
Idaho Code § 7-717 ................................................................................................................... 15 
Idaho Code § 7-718 ................................................................................................................... 47 
Idaho Code § 7 -721 ................................................................................................................... 53 
Idaho Code § 12-121 .................................................................................................... 12, 47, 51 
Idaho Code § 42-222 .............................................................................................. 18, 19,20,21 
OTHER 
Colson, Idaho's Constitution The Tie That Binds (1991) .................................................... 13 
Hutchins, The Idaho Law o/Water Rights, 13-17 (1956) ........................................................ .38 
J.1. Rodale, The Synonym Finder 56 (1961) ............................................................................. .40 
Reed, Scott W. "New Law for a New State, The Legal Impetus to Development of 
the Material Resources ofIdaho", 25 Idaho Yesterdays 55 (1981) ........................................ 14 




























1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Donald Cain and Carolyn Cain (the "Cains") of Moore, Idaho, are the Appellants in this 
appeal. The Respondents are three landowners who own more than 2200 acres of irrigated land 
in Butte County, and who will collectively be referred to herein as the "Ranchers". To the extent 
necessary, the individual Respondents will be referred to by their own names. 
From the perspective of the Cains, this case was purely and simply a trespass action. 
However, the Ranchers alleged a breach of contract of an oral pipeline easement ostensibly 
granted by Mr. Cain, estoppel, a civil conspiracy, and ultimately, a claim for private eminent 
domain. Given that the Ranchers' claims for relief on the first three counts were all rejected by 
the district court in a summary judgment, and because the Ranchers have not cross-appealed the 
court's decision in that regard, the focus and nature of this case is clearly one of eminent domain 
as far as the Ranchers are concerned. 
B. The Course of the Proceedings. 
When Mr. Cain discovered the existence of an I8-inch buried irrigation pipeline that 
had been placed across his property by the Ranchers, he filed a small claims action against the 
Ranchers seeking $5,000 for the cost of removal of the pipeline. R., Vol. 1, p. 16 at, 14. With 
the filing of the Ranchers' Complaint and their Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction, all matters were consolidated at the district court level. The Cains filed 
a counterclaim for trespass with their Answer. R., Vol. 1, pp. 42-46. 
The Cains and the Ranchers filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, with the 



























Cains seeking a judicial detennination that the Ranchers had trespassed on their property when 
they installed their irrigation pipeline without the Cains' knowledge or consent. The Ranchers 
sought summary judgment on their claim for breach of contract on the basis that the employee 
of one of them had obtained an oral easement or pennission from Mr. Cain to cross the Cains' 
property with the pipeline. The Ranchers also alleged estoppel against the Cains as a result of 
the Cains' claim of trespass given the Ranchers' assertion of an alleged oral easement or 
pennission. The Ranchers also sought summary judgment on an alleged conspiracy between the 
Cains and unidentified individuals regarding Mr. Cain's action in disabling the pipeline in order 
to bring the dispute to a conclusion. Finally, the Ranchers sought an order of condemnation of 
an easement through private eminent domain approximately one year after they had buried their 
pipeline on the Cains' property. 
The district court granted the Cains' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count One of 
the Ranchers' Complaint (Breach of Oral Contract) regarding the alleged oral easement. R., 
Vol. 4, p. 683. In response to the Cains' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Two 
(Estoppel), the court dismissed that claim. R., Vol. 4, p. 685. The court granted the Cains' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Three (Civil Conspiracy) on the basis that the 
Ranchers had submitted no evidence to support their claim. R., Vol. 4, pp. 685-6. 
The court granted the Ranchers' Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of eminent 
domain. R., Vol. 4, p. 683. The Cains sought a reconsideration of the district court's decision on 
the issue of eminent domain, which motion was denied. Given their deteriorating financial 
condition and the expense of participating in an evidentiary hearing on the issue of just 



























compensation, the Cains asked the court to proceed to judgment on that issue in order to allow 
this appeal. R., Vol. 6, p. 1085-6. A Final Judgment and Order was entered by the court on 
September 30, 2011 (R., Vol. 6, p. 1078), but was not received by the parties until later during 
the first week of October. On October 5, 2011, the Ranchers filed a Motion to Amend 
Complaint seeking to include a legal description of the easement area because it had never been 
included in their original Complaint pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-707(5) (R., Vol. 6, p. 1109). 
The Ranchers subsequently withdrew their motion upon receiving the court's Final Judgment 
and Order, and Order of Condemnation (R., Vol. 6, p. 1081). 
Both parties claimed costs and attorney fees. The Ranchers also sought Rule 11 
sanctions against the Cains and their attorney as a result oftheir filing of a Notice of Objection 
to Form of Judgment (R., Vol. 6, p. 1022) because a legal description of the easement sought to 
be obtained by eminent domain had never been included in the Complaint. The district court 
denied the Ranchers' motion for Rule 11 sanctions, and also denied attorney fees to both parties 
based solely on a "prevailing party" analysis. R., Vol. 6, p. 1255. This appeal followed. 
C. Statement of the Facts. 
The Ranchers own developed and irrigated farmland in Butte County, Idaho. Telford 
Lands, LLC ("Telford"), one of the Ranchers, owns 1985 acres of property that is irrigated, in 
part, with 37.03 cfs of groundwater. See chart included in Exhibit "B" to Exhibit "B" of 
Plaintiffs Complaint at R., Vol. 8, p. 1306. Mitchell Sorensen ("Sorensen") has a water right for 
0.8 cfs for the irrigation of 40 acres. Id. at pp. 856-67. PU Ranch ("PU Ranch") irrigates 264 
acres with groundwater rights whose combined rate of diversion is 2.9 cfs. Id. at pp. 858-64. 



























The priority dates for those water rights date back to May 8, 1955, with the latest priority being 
April 6, 1982. Id. The water rights are all developed and decreed irrigation water rights. Id. The 
Ranchers' water rights are also included in Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Dr. Charles Brockway at 
R., Vol. 5., pp. 815-855. The Ranchers' land had been developed by pumping their groundwater 
into a canal owned by the BLRID known as the Moore Canal. Complaint at ~ 11, R., Vol. 8, p. 
1276. All such groundwater was transported and delivered to the authorized place of use for 
agricultural purposes. Id Those groundwater rights were delivered by the Big Lost River 
Irrigation District ("BLRID") pursuant to Transport Agreements (the "GW Transport 
Agreements") executed between the Ranchers and BLRID. Id In addition to the GW Transport 
Agreements for the groundwater rights referenced herein, the Ranchers own other ground and 
surface water rights that are also delivered by BLRID through similar or identical other 
transport agreements (the "Other Transport Agreements") which are still in effect. James 
Rindfleisch, the manager of the BLRID, testified in his deposition about the existence of the 
Other Transport Agreements held by each of the Ranchers, and identified five of them as 
Exhibits 8 through 11 in his deposition. R., Vol. 4, pp. 797-8. 
For thirty or more years, the BLRID's delivery of those groundwater rights in the Moore 
Canal as a result of the GW Transport Agreements appears to have functioned in order to allow 
for the development of the Ranchers' land. 
The Ranchers diverted their groundwater from wells at the locations shown on the aerial 
photograph attached as Exhibit "A" to the Ranchers' Complaint. R., Vol. 8 at p. 1288. Boyd 
Burnett, one of the Ranchers' employees, identified the information on the map during his 



























deposition. Burnett Deposition, pp. 14-16, R., Vol. 1, p. 335. The wells were all identified by 
their common name in depositions, and this document was used in subsequent depositions of 
multiple individuals and was provided to the district court. See, e.g., Exhibit 1 to Rindfleisch 
Deposition at R., Vol. 2, p. 807. A color version of that aerial photograph is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A" for the convenience of the Court. The point of diversion for the PU Ranch 
groundwater rights is denominated as the "PU Well". The point of diversion for the Sorensen 
groundwater right is identified as the "Old Moss Well". Both of those wells are located on the 
east side of Highway 93, and are "upstream" in terms of elevation from the "Burnett Well" 
located on the west side of Highway 93, which is the point of diversion for Telford's 
groundwater rights referenced above. Water was historically pumped from those wells and 
discharged directly into the Moore Canal for transport to the Ranchers' property on the "Era 
Flat" which is some miles distant from the Ranchers' wells. Ranchers' Complaint at ~ 10, R., 
Vol. 8, p. 1276. 
Things apparently began to change after Telford bought its property in 2007. Tr., 
10/13/2010 at p. 116, LL. 23-25. Michael Telford testified that he was the managing member of 
Telford Lands, LLC. R., Vol. 2, p. 316 at p. 5, LL. 13-15. He testified that he was the "bulldog" 
in seeking to unite Sorensen and the PU Ranch in pursuit of the construction of a pipeline 
project in order to avoid the use of the GW Transport Agreements in the Moore Canal for those 
groundwater rights mentioned above. R., Vol. 2, p. 317 at p. 9, LL. 70-11. According to 
Respondent Mitchell Sorensen: 
I can tell you that I was aware that our initial plan was to 
converge a pipeline from the Old Moss Well with the P.U. Well in 



























- within the property boundaries of the P.u. property, just 
approximately an 11 acre parcel of ground. 
Then to take a single pipeline from that point of 
convergence running along the bank or inside of the bank of the 
Big Lost River Irrigation District's Moore Canal. 
As Mr. Burnett described it, then dive through the bank into 
the canal immediately before we entered the abandoned culvert. 
Sorensen Deposition, p. 28, LL. 21-25, p. 29, LL. 1-6, R., Vol. 2, p. 302. 
Consistent with Sorensen's explanation, the Ranchers pursued the pipeline project by 
connecting the PU Well and the Old Moss Well on their own property. They then ran a pipeline 
into the Moore Canal right-of-way and underneath Highway 93 to connect with Telford's 
Burnett Well. R., VoL 4, p. 766. See also Ranchers' Complaint at ~ 13, R., VoL 8, p. 1277. In 
order to cross Highway 93 with their pipeline, the Ranchers, without obtaining BLRID's 
permission, laid their 18-inch pipeline in a culvert that was a part of the Moore Canal belonging 
to BLRID. Id. When BLRID discovered that the Ranchers' pipeline had been placed in their 
culvert, the BLRlD apparently took umbrage and, according to Sorensen, "irreverently" 
removed the pipeline from the culvert in the Moore Canal. Ranchers' Complaint at ~ 14, R., 
Vol. 8, p. 1277; see also Deposition of Mitchell Sorensen at p. 30, LL. 5-8, R., Vol. 2, p. 303. 
Not to be deterred by such irreverence, the Ranchers filed suit against the BLRlD alleging that 
the culvert had been abandoned. Id. BLRlD disagreed. In order to resolve that lawsuit, and in 
apparent recognition that they were going to lose that battle, the Ranchers entered into a 
Settlement Agreement with BLRID which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Ranchers' 
Complaint, and which is included in the Record. R., Vol. 1, pp. 208-225. The Settlement 



























Agreement addressed the Ranchers' construction of the pipeline, with the Ranchers' having to 
agree that they would never use the BLRID's culvert. R., Vol. 1, p. 15 at ~ 7. See also R, Vol. 
1, p. 210 at ~ 1. In order to restore their broken pipeline connection, the Ranchers simply moved 
the pipeline up and out of the Moore Canal right-of-way and onto the Cains' adjacent property, 
and then bored underneath Highway 93. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Settlement Agreement, 
the OW Transport Agreements between BLRID and both Telford and PU Ranch were to remain 
in full force and effect throughout 2009, even after the pipeline was operational, but they would 
terminate on December 31, 2009. R, Vol. 1, p. 212 at ~ 12. The Other Transport Agreements 
for the conveyance of the Ranchers' other water rights in the Moore Canal were not to be 
impacted or affected by the Settlement Agreement. Id 
Contemporaneous handwritten notes about what the Ranchers wanted out of the 
settlement negotiations with BLRID were authored by Robert Harris, the Ranchers' attorney, 
and were submitted as evidence to the court by him in his Affidavit in Support of the Ranchers' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the "Harris Affidavit") commencing at R., Vol. 3, p. 
441. His handwritten notes themselves are included at R, Vol. 3, pp. 446-450, inclusive. Those 
notes will be discussed in greater detail, infra, but they acknowledge that perpetual easements 
were required to protect the Ranchers, and that there were two easements that had to be 
obtained. R, Vol. 3, p. 447. The required easement on the east side of Highway 93 was across 
the Cains' property which the Ranchers knew was owned by the Cains. Deposition of Boyd 
Burnett, p. 13, LL. 4-11, R., Vol. 2, p. 334. Mr. Burnett testified that he had just started 
working for Mitchell Sorensen in April of 2009, just prior to the pipeline construction, p. 10, 



























LL. 1-3 and LL. 22-25, R., Vol. 2, p. 334. 
The required easement located on the west side of Highway 93 was situated on land 
owned by an individual named Buckwalter [sic - Buck/Walder]. Telford Deposition, p. 31, LL. 
1-4, R., Vol. 2, p. 323. Telford testified in his deposition that Buckwalter was the only property 
owner whose easement they needed for the pipeline "other than Mr. Cain," the omission of 
which he deemed to be merely an "oversight". Telford Deposition, p. 30, LL. 3-7, R., Vol. 2, p. 
323. When asked to confirm that the placement of the pipeline on the Cain property without 
first obtaining an easement was just an oversight on the part of the Ranchers, Mr. Telford 
confirmed that was the case. Telford Deposition, p. 42, LL. 19-21, R., Vol. 2, p. 326. 
In Burnett's Deposition, he testified that he was asked by Mike Telford and Mitchell 
Sorensen to visit with Don Cain about obtaining an easement through his property for purposes 
of running the pipeline. Burnett Deposition, p. l3, LL. 3-8, R., Vol. 2, p. 334. He testified that 
Telford and Sorensen were aware that Don Cain owned that property. Id at LL. 9-11. Burnett 
testified that he was aware that Mr. Telford had obtained the required easement through the 
Buckwalter property. Burnett Deposition, p. 18, LL. 1-5, R., Vol. 2, p. 336. Burnett's testified 
that he went to ask Mr. Cain for an easement on his property, but that he did not provide him 
with "a whole lot of specific information." Id at p. 19, LL. 1-8. He further testified that he 
advised Cain that they wanted to "come up to the [Cain] property and then fairly close to the 
Moore Canal and down through the [BLRlD] culvert. We were planning on putting it through 
the [BLRlD] culvert at the time that was existing there." Burnett Deposition, p. 20, LL. 17-22, 
R., Vol. 2, p. 336. Burnett reaffirmed that he was only talking to Cain about a pipeline along the 



























Moore Canal and going through the BLRID culvert. Id. at p. 28, LL. 15-19, R., VoL 2, p. 338. 
Cain consistently and unequivocally denied that he ever gave Mr. Burnett or anyone else 
permission to install a pipeline anywhere on his property, whether within the Moore Canal 
right-of-way as originally constructed by the Ranchers, or elsewhere on his property, as they 
subsequently did. Cain Deposition, p. 155, LL. 14-21, R., Vol. 3, p. 517. He stated as much to 
Judge Tingey at the hearing on the Ranchers' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order on May 
19, 2010. See Tr., 10113/2010 at p. 14, LL. 7-17 and p. 16, LL. 1-4. He testified in his 
deposition that he recalled Mr. Burnett coming to his office to ask if he could run a 4-inch line 
"in a small hole in the Big Lost River Irrigation District." Cain Deposition, p. 49, LL. 1-13, R., 
VoL 3, p. 513. Mr. Cain advised Mr. Burnett that he had just returned from a lengthy trip, was 
too busy to talk to him about it at that time, and that Burnett should come back with specific 
plans. That never happened. Id. Cain testified that he and his wife own approximately two miles 
of highway frontage along Highway 93. Cain Deposition, p. 55, 1. 22, R., VoL 3, p. 514. 
Carolyn Cain stated in her Affidavit that no one ever spoke with her about an easement on their 
community property. R., VoL 2, p. 364. 
Mitch Sorensen acknowledged in his deposition that it was "apparent to us [Ranchers] 
that we needed to secure easements from property owners as we commenced this project .... " 
Sorensen Deposition, p. 7, LL. 14-16, R., VoL 2, p. 297. Mike Telford characterized the lack of 
an easement on the Cain property as simply an oversight "[u]ntil the time we sent Boyd 
[Burnett]." Telford Deposition, p. 42, LL. 19-21, R., Vol. 2, p. 326. Telford acknowledged that 
he knew that the current location of the pipeline on the Cains' property was clearly located 



























outside of the BLRID right-of-way. Id. at p. 33, R., VoL 2, p. 326. Notwithstanding that 
knowledge, he testified, "We didn't even consider the fact that it was a problem to just move 
over and go through." Telford Deposition, p. 35, L 25 and p. 36, LL. 1-2, R, VoL 2, p. 324. 
In their Counterclaim, the Cains alleged a trespass and sought removal of the pipeline 
from their property (R., VoL 1, p. 45). Don Cain testified in his deposition that he was not 
interested in selling his property. Cain Deposition, p. 197, LL. 13-18, R., VoL 3, p. 521. 
Don Cain also testified in his deposition that he first discovered that the pipeline had 
been installed on his property in or about August of 2009, and he filed a report with the Butte 
County Sheriffs Office at that time. Cain Deposition, p. 47, LL. 1-10, R., VoL 3, p. 513. The 
Moore Canal highway crossing is located approximately a half mile north of the Cains' 
residence. Id. at p. 48, LL. 12-16., R, VoL 3, p. 513. At the time of his discovery, he was 
meeting with James Rindfleisch, the manager of the BLRID, to discuss District approval for 
putting a fence or a gate across the Moore CanaL Cain Deposition, p. 56, LL. 20-25, p. 57, LL. 
1-11., R., VoL 3, p. 514. 
Rindfleisch confirmed Cain's statement that Cain discovered the existence of the buried 
pipeline on his property at that time when he was going to install some fencing near the canaL 
Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 8, LL. 1-5, R, Vol. 4, p. 792. He testified that Cain discovered a 
yellow pipe sticking up out of the ground and Cain asked Rindfleisch what it was. Id. 
Rindfleisch advised Cain that it was where the pipeline had been buried. Id. That discovery 
prompted the filing of Cains' small claims action. Frustrated by a hearing delay in the small 
claims action requested by the Ranchers, and sensing that matters would continue to drag on, 



























Cain took matters into his own hands. He dug down to the buried pipeline and punched a hole 
through the top of the pipe. See R., Vol. 7, Ranchers' Exhibit "]", submitted at their hearing for 
a temporary restraining order. Immediately thereafter, Cain sent a letter to each of the Ranchers 
informing them of what he had done. See Ranchers' Exhibit "I" in R., Vol. 7. That action 
precipitated the Ranchers' filing of their Complaint and Application for Temporary Restraining 
Order in this litigation. 










II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Were the Cains denied due process of law as a result of the Ranchers taking an 
interest in the Cains' property without complying with Idaho law, and before just compensation 
was ascertained and paid in the manner provided by law? 
2. Did the Ranchers create their own alleged necessity by agreeing to voluntarily 
terminate the OW Transport Agreements for the conveyance of certain of their water rights? 
3. Did the Ranchers' actions of placing their pipeline across the Cains' property 














4. If the Ranchers' property, and their water rights, were fully developed prior to 
the time of the pipeline installation on the Cains' property, were the Ranchers entitled to 
exercise the private right of eminent domain? 
5. Was the Ranchers' Complaint facially deficient under the provisions of Title 7 of 
the Idaho Code for multiple reasons, including its failure to specifically describe the easement 
claimed by the Ranchers? 
6. Did the district court err in failing to dismiss Telford Lands, LLC as a party to 
this litigation? 
7. Was it an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court in denying costs and 
attorney fees to the Cains by applying only a prevailing party analysis? 
8. Should the Cains be awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.A.R 
24 Rules 40 and 41, Idaho Code § 12-121, and applicable Idaho case law, including Ada County 
25 Highway District v. Acarregui, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983) and Erickson v. Amoth, 
26 



























112 Idaho 1122, 739 P.2d 421 (App. 1987)? 
Ill. ARGUMENT 
A. Were the Cains denied due process of law as a result of the Ranchers taking an 
interest in the Cains' property without complying with Idaho law, and before just 
compensation was ascertained and paid in the manner provided by law? 
Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution provides: 
§ 14. Right of eminent domain. - The necessary use of lands 
for the construction of reservoirs or storage basins, for the purpose 
of irrigation, or for rights of way for the construction of canals, 
ditches, flumes or pipes, to convey water to the place of use for any 
useful, beneficial or necessary purpose, or for drainage; or for the 
drainage of mines, or the working thereof, by means of roads, 
railroads, tramways, cuts, tunnels, shafts, hoisting works, dumps, 
or . other necessary means to their complete development, or any 
other use necessary to the complete development of the material 
resources of the state, or the preservation of the health of its 
inhabitants, is hereby declared to be a public use, and subject to the 
regulation and control of the state. 
Private property may be taken for public use, but not until a 
just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed 
by law, shall be paid therefor. 
(Emphasis added). This provision of the Idaho Constitution was the focus of much debate and 
discord among the delegates who attended the Constitutional Convention. Colson, Idaho's 
Constitution - The Tie That Binds (1991). According to Professor Colson: 
A popular treatise on eminent domain widely used in 1889 stated, 
"As between individuals, no necessity however great, no exigency 
however imminent, no improvement however valuable, no refusal 
however unneighborly, no obstinacy however unreasonable, no 
offers of compensation however extravagant, can compel or require 
a man to part with one inch of his estate." Albert Hagan 
summarized this precedent on the floor of the convention when he 
said, flI do not know any state in the Union that has any such 
provision, that private property - my property, shall be taken for 
the benefit of my neighbor." 



























Id at p. 67. In a treatise authored by Idaho attorney Scott Reed, the following statement by a 
Constitutional delegate is found: 
Do it under the forms of law if you choose, but it is nothing but 
legalized robbery, an invasion of the inalienable rights of the 
individual to possess his own property and protect it, and we 
propose today to incorporate in the charter of this state the right to 
take an individual's property from him and give it to another, but 
not taking it for a public use. Now, gentlemen, it is impossible to 
accomplish that without injustice." 
Quoting George Ainslie, Boise County Delegate, Idaho Constitution Convention. Reed, Scott 
W. "New Law for a New State, The Legal Impetus to Development of the Material Resources 
ofIdaho", 25 Idaho Yesterdays 55 (1981). 
Suffice it to say, Professor Colson and Mr. Reed explained in great detail the difference 
of opinions held by various delegates regarding this provision. In the end, however, it was 
adopted, and the private right of eminent domain became a part of Idaho's law. While private 
property could be taken for a use necessary to the complete development of the material 
resources of the state, the delegates determined that such action could not occur "until a just 
compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefor." 
As finally observed by Mr. Reed in his treatise: 
In 1981 Idaho has thousands of miles of paved roads, burgeoning 
cities, millions of acres in irrigated farmland, mines, lumber mills, 
and expanding widely diverse industries. An observer would think 
the state to be fully developed or even verging on 
overdevelopment. Though the practice of instituting condemnation 
actions for essentially private purposes has not been totally 
abandoned, such lawsuits are seldom used. The need for them no 
longer exists." 
Reed, supra, at p. 55. 



























Constitutional and statutory condemnation issues were discussed in the original 
summary judgment arguments and briefings before Judge Tingey in this case, as well as in the 
reconsideration motion heard by Judge Watkins. The Ranchers admitted that the pipeline was 
initially installed in May of 2009 (Reconsideration Tr., 4120/2011 at p. 22, LL. 19-21), but that 
their eminent domain proceeding against the Cains was not initiated until a year later on May 
14, 2010. Id at p. 23, LL. 11-12. The parties both cited Canyon View Irrigation Co., v. Twin 
Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 607, 619 P.2d 122, 125 (1980) for the following proposition: 
To condemn such a [private] right of way, the water right owners 
must proceed under Idaho's law of eminent domain, found in IC §§ 
7-701, et seq. 
The Ranchers cited Canyon View, supra, for the proposition that "the irrigation and reclamation 
of arid lands is a well recognized public use" in order to justify their taking. That topic will be 
discussed in greater detail, infra, but the concept of the Ranchers' use being a qualified "public" 
use for the full development of the material resources of the state was a recurrent theme of 
theirs throughout the briefing and oral arguments in this case. Both the Idaho Constitution and 
Idaho Code § 7-717 provide that just compensation must be paid in advance of any taking of 
private property. In the instant case, the Ranchers had already appropriated the Cains' property 
to their own use for a year prior to the institution of the filing of their Complaint. 
The evidence showed that the Cains resided on their property in Butte County, but 
notwithstanding Idaho Code § 7-707(7), it is apparent that compensation negotiations with the 
Ranchers and the Cains only first occurred after Cains' discovery of the existence of the pipeline 
in August of 2009. As acknowledged by the Ranchers in oral argument, the pipeline was 



























installed on the Cains' property in Mayor June of2009. Tr., 10/1312010 at p. 75, LL. 11-12; See 
also Reconsideration Tr., 4/20/2011 at p. 22, LL. 19-21. The Ranchers stated that they 
"presumed" they had authorization to install such a pipeline. Tr., 10/13/2010 at p. 75, at LL. 14-
15. With regard to the Cains' assertion of a trespass, the Ranchers simply argued that their 
position to Cain was, "Well, we've got a pipeline there. Can we purchase the easement from 
you?" fd. at LL. 22-23. When after-the-fact negotiations failed, the Ranchers opted for eminent 
domain, an option they did not have as against the BLRID as a result of their initial pipeline 
trespass. The Ranchers identified their first "good faith negotiation" in one of their briefs as 
having occurred on September 25, 2009, when they offered the Cains $500 for the easement. 
R., Vol. 1, p. 98. That "good faith offer" was made approximately four (4) months after they 
had already taken the property for their own use. It is abundantly clear that the Cains were 
deprived of due process as a result of the Ranchers' strained interpretation of the law of eminent 
domain. At paragraph 51 of their Complaint, the Ranchers stated: 
Plaintiffs have therefore undertaken good faith negotiations to 
acquire and purchase the land sought to be taken and been unable 
to make any reasonable bargain therefor. 
R., Vol. 8, p. 1283. However, by the time they filed their Complaint, the Ranchers had already 
been using the Cains' property for a year. Only after the Cains discovered the existence of the 
pipeline on their property did the Ranchers ever think about negotiating with them. That was 
more than a mere "oversight". It was a clear violation of constitutional due process, and a clear 
violation of Title 7 of the Idaho Code. On this basis alone, the decision of the district court on 
the issue of eminent domain should be vacated with instructions to the district court to enter a 



























judgment in favor of the Cains on the trespass claim they asserted in their Counterclaim. 
B. Did the Ranchers create their own alleged necessity by agreeing to voluntarily 
terminate the GW Transport Agreements for the conveyance of certain of their water 
rights? 
Judge Tingey saw this issue as one of the critical issues in this case. Tr., 10/13/2010 at 
p. 65, LL. 3-10. Mr. Cain made a cogent statement to him during the hearing on the temporary 
restraining order in response to the Ranchers' arguments that they were unable to get their 
water: 
But, Your Honor, I don't think they have a right to have that pipe 
there in the first place. If they wouldn't have put it there, they 
wouldn't have been making the choices of being without water. If 
they would have left it where it was delivered, it was doing what 
they needed. That's where they're at now. That's how they have the 
crops they have now. That water came from that canal as their 
water right says it's supposed to be delivered, okay. And I've found 
nothing yet that changed that water right that they couldn't deliver 
it the same way. So that's all I have to say. 
Tr., 5/1912010 at p. 37, LL. 2-12. Mr. Cain was correct regarding what the Ranchers' approved 
water rights stated about their rights being delivered through the Moore Canal. Michael Telford 
testified that he acquired his property from Mr. Mickelsen [sic - Mickelsen Properties, LLC]. 
Deposition of Michael Telford, p. 6, LL. 18-19, R., Vol. 2, p. 317. Mickelsen and his attorneys 
[now the Ranchers' attorneys] had undertaken IDWR Transfer No. 71254 in 2006 for a number 
of its water rights, including those transported by Mickelsen [and now Telford] pursuant to the 
GW Transport Agreements. Conditions of approval of that transfer were identified for each of 
those water rights, one of which clearly indicated that the water was delivered through the 
Moore Canal or the Moore Diversion. See Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Dr. Charles Brockway at 



























R., Vol. 5, pp. 816, ~ 7; 822, ~ 15; 826, ~ 7; 832, ~ 2; 836, ~ 4; 841, ~ 3; 846, ~ 12; and 580, ~ 
16; see also R., Vol. 8, pp. 1490-1520. Dr. Brockway examined the water rights and determined 
that each contained that condition of approval as part of the transfer application. According to 
Idaho Code § 42-222(1), the director of the IDWR may approve a requested transfer "in whole 
or in part, or upon conditions . ... " (Emphasis added). 
The PU Ranch water rights are also shown on Exhibit "B" to the Settlement Agreement. 
The PU Ranch uses groundwater to irrigate 264 acres pursuant to two (2) groundwater rights. 
Information relative to Water Right Nos. 34-7079 and 34-2332 is identified in the Settlement 
Agreement, and is contained at R., Vol. 8, pp. 1475-1484. Not unlike the Telford rights, the 
description of the diverting works as shown in paragraph 3(c)(I)(b) of PU Ranch's transfer 
application indicates that the groundwater is diverted through "well, pump, open discharge into 
Moore CanaL" R., Vol. 8, p. 1486. When the transfer of that water right was approved in 1985, 
the IDWR stated the following limitation and condition: 
No more than 2.90 cfs or 435 acre feet per annum shall be injected 
into the Moore Canal. 
R., Vol. 8, p. 1489. Richard Tuthill signed those applications as being truthful and stated: 
Water from the well will [be] discharged directly into the Moore 
Canal, where it will be redirected into the old UC canal. After 
leaving the Big Lost River irrigation district the water will be 
carried to the place of use through the Timber Dome Canal. 
Id Like Telford, PU Ranch had a GW Transport Agreement for its groundwater rights. The 
IDWR's condition of approval for the transfer of the PU Ranch water rights identified transport 
of the water via the Moore Canal. The Ranchers argued that those conditions were meaningless, 



























because the SRBA decrees do not include those conditions as elements of a water right. Even 
though not a statutorily prescribed element of an SRBA decree, those conditions are still a valid 
and applicable condition of an approved IDWR transfer. 
The Ranchers urged the court to find that conditions of approval attached to a transfer 
were really not "conditions" despite the rather clear language ofIdaho Code § 42-222 authorizing 
the Director of the IDWR to consider a transfer and to "approve the change in whole, or in part, or 
upon conditions. . .. (Emphasis added). In the instant case, the court stated: 
The [c ]ourt however finds that identification of a delivery system in 
a permit, license, transfer application or other similar document is 
for descriptive purposes only and has no binding effect for purposes 
ofthe pending motions. 
Order at p. 7. The Idaho Supreme Court has clearly affirmed the statutory authority of the IDWR 
to impose conditions on a water right permit or upon a transfer application. Dovel v. Dobson, 122 
Idaho 59, 831 P.2d 527 (1992). Adopting the court's rationale in the case at bar would strip the 
Director of the IDWR of his statutory authority, and would render meaningless the condition that 
"water [be] delivered through the Moore Diversion and Timberdome Canal," as in Telford's 
Transfer No. 71254. The same would be true for the PU Ranch transfer which was "subject to the 
following limitations and conditions": 
... 2. No more than 2.90 cfs or 435 acre feet per annum shall be 
injected into the Moore Canal. 
Telford's Transfer No. 74921 attached to the Affidavit of Ernest Carlsen likewise contains the 
condition of approval as follows: 
Water delivered through the Moore Diversion and Timberdome 
Canal. 



























R., Vol. 3, p. 579. It is of interest to note that Mr. Carlsen approved that transfer as the authorized 
IDWR representative on January 14, 2009, and imposed those "conditions of approval" as 
required by Idaho Code § 42-222. A mere year and a half later, Mr. Carlsen was a paid consultant 
for the Ranchers, and he suggested in his Affidavit that those "conditions of approval" were really 
not conditions at all, but rather, were only explanations. Id. at ~ 15. The Affidavit of Dr. Charles 
E. Brockway, a recognized hydrologist and water right engineer in Idaho since 1965, clearly 
refuted the suggestions of Mr. Carlsen. In his Affidavit, Dr. Brockway stated: 
7. Water right transfers can result in changes to the 
elements of a water right or the conditions contained in the water 
right. 
8. If water rights are transferred, and conditions are 
appended to specific rights, it is my experience that those conditions 
are directives for administration of the right. Unless discretion is 
specifically outlined in a condition then administration by the 
Watermaster is explicit and those conditions of approval are more 
than just explanatory or informational remarks. 
9. The conditions of approval of the water right can only 
be modified by subsequent application for transfer or petition to the 
IDWR. 
R., Vol. 5, p. 813. As noted by Dr. Brockway, conditions of approval on a transfer, such as those 
contained in the Ranchers' water right transfers, can be modified only by subsequent application 
for transfer or petition to the IDWR. Courts are required to give meaning to all the words of such a 
document imposed as a condition in accordance with the terms of the statute. According 
meaninglessness to those conditions of approval is inconsistent with the role of the judiciary 
insofar as the legislative enactment is concerned. 
In Matter of Permit No. 47-7680, 114 Idaho 600, 759 P.2d 891 (1988), the Idaho Supreme 



























Court had an opportunity to construe language pertaining to the IDWR's issuance of a water 
permit with conditions pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-203A(5), a statute which contains language 
virtually identical to Idaho Code § 42-222 regarding transfers. Both statutes adopted by the 
legislature allow the Director of the IDWR to approve, deny, or approve such an application upon 
conditions. In Matter of Permit No. 47-7680, the district court purported to affirm the IDWR's 
granting of the permit, but summarily eliminated the conditions. The Idaho Supreme Court 
reversed the district court as to the elimination of the validity of the conditions of approval and 
stated: 
Each of these conditions are within the authority granted the 
department by the legislature. When the legislature enacted I.e. § 42-
203A(5) it clearly vested, in the director of the Department of Water 
Resources, considerable authority and discretion to determine and 
protect the "local public interest" when issuing or rejecting water 
permits. I.C. § 42-203A(5) specifically gives the director authority to 
"grant a permit upon conditions." 
114 Idaho at 606. 
The conditions of approval for each of the transfers for the Ranchers in the instant case 
are not mere niceties that were to be simply disregarded by the district court. If the Ranchers 
desire to eliminate the condition regarding transport via the Moore Canal, they can file the 
appropriate application with the IDWR. That will afford all members of the public, including the 
Cains, with the requisite notice and due process to participate in the administrative action that 
would be undertaken by the Department. See Affidavit of Dr. Charles E. Brockway. R., Vol. 5, p. 
813. Suffice it to say, and consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Matter of Permit 
No. 47-7680, it was not within the province of the district court to invalidate or ignore an express 



























condition of approval imposed by the Department pursuant to legislative enactment. The 
Ranchers' water rights were acquired or transferred on the representation that they would be 
transported via the Moore Canal. It all comes back to the same issue, i.e., the Ranchers cannot 
simply terminate a select few of their Transport Agreements via the Moore Canal in order to 
create the necessity required for an eminent domain proceeding. 
Instead of continuing the GW Transport Agreement as had historically been done, 
BLRID manager Rindfleisch testified that the GW Transport Agreements were terminated at 
the request of the Ranchers. Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 19, LL. 1-19, R., Vol. 4, p. 795; See also 
Rindfleisch Affidavit ~ 1, R., Vol. 2, p. 361; See also Harris Affidavit, R., Vol. 3, p. 447, where 
"terminate existing GW [Agreements]" was clearly identified as a part of the Ranchers' plan. In 
other words, PU Ranch, like Telford, had a reasonably available means of water conveyance at 
their disposal that was legally and historically adequate and sufficient for their purposes. Instead 
of using the Moore Canal, which had always been the historical means of delivery of their water 
as expressly described as a condition in their water rights transfers, Telford and PU Ranch 
simply chose to terminate their GW Transport Agreements. In Erickson v. Amoth, 99 Idaho 907, 
591 P.2d 1074 (1978) ["Erickson I"], the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court 
decision that an alternative means of access was available to the Ericksons by virtue of a license 
agreement, not unlike the transport agreements in this case. The Court stated: 
However, the Amoths specifically allege that the Ericksons had 
alternative means of access and produced evidence of such 
alternative means of access, including one road then in use by the 
Ericksons pursuant to a license agreement with the Lederhoses, 
who owned adjoining property. It was then incumbent upon the 
Ericksons to prove that the alternative means of access were not 



























available to them or that such means of access were not reasonably 
adequate or sufficient for their purposes. (Citations omitted). The 
evidence supports the finding of the trial court that alternative 
access routes existed and the trial court was, therefore, correct in 
holding a case of necessity did not exist. (Citation omitted). 
The Ericksons further argue that the trial court erred in not fmding 
that the license agreement providing access over the Lederhoses' 
land was a limited license. The fact that the Ericksons' existing 
access was by way of a license, rather than an easement across the 
Lederhoses' land, does not destroy either the evidence or the 
finding of the court that alternative access routes existed nor the 
trial court's holding based thereon that necessity for condemnation 
did not exist. (Citation omitted). 
99 Idaho at 910. This case presents a virtually identical set of facts. An alternative method of 
delivery of their irrigation water had always been available to both Telford and PU Ranch by 
virtue of the GW Transport Agreements. PU Ranch had previously sued BLRID to enforce the 
GW Transport Agreement. R., Vol. 8, pp. 1469-1474. Rather than using those GW Transport 
Agreements as their water rights transfers specifically prescribed as a condition, the Ranchers 
sought termination of those agreements in the Settlement Agreement. This appears to be 
nothing more than a contrivance to convince the Court that necessity existed for condemning an 
easement across the Cains' property. To the Cains, it appears that this is nothing more than an 
old-fashioned attempt to run over them for the private benefit of the Ranchers. While it might 
admittedly have been more convenient, and while it may have made economic sense to tie all 
the Ranchers' wells together for the purposes of pumping, it clearly was not a necessity that 
would give rise to the invocation of the harsh power of private eminent domain as sought by the 
Ranchers in this action. In Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 210 P.3d 75 (2009), this 



























Court considered a private condemnation case, and in that context, stated the following: 
We stated, "This Court has never held that private 
individuals may take the property of other private individuals in 
order to enhance their purely private enjoyment of their property. 
The proposed use need not be strictly public, but it must at least 
benefit the public welfare or the economy of the economy of the 
state." Id at 84, 867 P.2d at 958 (emphasis in original). With 
respect to the meaning of the phrase "the complete development of 
the material resources of the state," we said: 
We believe this provision in the Constitution was meant to 
enable those seeking to develop valuable resources, such as 
timber, minerals, or other products of natural resources, 
from being thwarted by an inability to get access to these 
resources across the property of another. 
210 P.3d at 85. As further evidence that it was not a matter of necessity, but rather sheer 
convenience, this Court need look no further than the Ranchers' own Response to Interrogatory 
No. 19 at R., Vol., 8, p. 1454, where the Ranchers unequivocally stated: 
Without all three partners involved, the project would not have 
been undertaken as the participation of all three individuals/entities 
was necessary to make the project economically feasible. 
Simply stated, the Ranchers did not meet their burden of proof on the issue of necessity. 
Summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the Cains on this issue as to Telford 
and the PU Ranch. 
Sorensen's water rights are somewhat different, but the result should be the same. He 
purchased IDWR Water Right No. 34-13841, a portion of IDWR Water Right No. 34-7120, 
for.8 cfs to irrigate 40 acres. Sorensen Deposition, p. 41, LL. 7-18, R., Vol. 2, p. 305. When his 
predecessor [and now, employee], Boyd Burnett, applied for that right, he specifically indicated 
that the water to be appropriated was to be transported through the Moore Canal. R., Vol. 2, p. 



























277. In his Proof of Application of Water to Beneficial Use, he acknowledged that the water 
was conducted to its place of use "through the Moore Canal." Id. at p. 279. Sorensen testified 
that the Old Moss Well that pumped that water was connected to a pipeline that ran 
approximately 500 feet due south from the well and discharged through the bank of the Moore 
Canal into the Moore Canal. Sorensen Deposition, p. 10, LL. 7-12, R., Vol. 2, p. 298. That was 
consistent with the water right application and proof of beneficial use filed by Mr. Burnett. Mr. 
Sorensen testified that he was aware that this water right had been transported through the 





And were you aware that Water Right 34-7120, that is the 
parent to this right, was transported - or was subject of a 
Transport Agreement with the Big Lost River Irrigation 
District? 
That it was subject to that Transport Agreement? 
Or that it had a Transport Agreement for its delivery. 
Yes, I was aware that this water right had been transported 
through the Moore Canal pursuant to a Transport 
Agreement. 
Sorensen Deposition, p. 34, LL. 10-21, R., Vol. 2, p. 304. When Sorensen pursued the 
temporary transfer for two other totally unrelated water rights, the BLRID submitted a protest to 
the Idaho Department of Water Resources, and advised the IDWR that no transport agreement 
was in place for those two rights. R., Vol. 1, pp. 111-12. According to Sorensen's Temporary 
Change Application attached to the second letter (R., Vol. 1, pp. 113-14), Sorensen was 
proposing that a total of 8.34 cfs of water rights would be transferred to the Old Moss Well. 
That was significantly more water than had ever been historically subject to a transport 
agreement for Water Right No. 34-7120. Sorensen suggested that the BLRID's protest of that 



























unrelated transfer equated to his perceived inability to ever obtain a transport agreement from 
the BLRID. Sorensen Deposition, p. 46, LL. 5-25 and p. 47, LL. 1-16, R., Vol. 2, p. 307. Any 
attempts by the Ranchers to use those letters that pertain to two totally unrelated water rights as 
the basis for their current assertion of necessity may be viewed by the Court as being 
disingenuous. Even Sorensen himself acknowledged that the letter from the BLRID protesting 
the temporary transfer was not relevant to his .8 cfs water right in any way. The following 
colloquy occurred in his deposition: 
Q. Now, when you go to the letter from the department-
or the Big Lost River Irrigation District, they were protesting those 
two water rights, it appears. 
How does that - here's the letter when they protested those 
two water rights. 
How does that pertain to your 34-7120 water right? 
A. Excellent question. This letter is not pertinent, as you've 
just said. 
Sorensen Deposition, p. 65, LL. 6-15, R., Vol. 2, p. 311. The Ranchers asserted in their 
Memorandum that it was "the BLRID's position that it would not enter into a transport 
agreement with Sorensen." That was consistent with the assertions of Sorensen in his 
deposition. Sorensen Deposition, p. 46, LL. 10-12, R., Vol. 2, p. 307. He stated, " ... I could 
not get a Transport Agreement from the Irrigation District to convey my water right." Id. He 
contradicted that statement later in his deposition when he candidly admitted that he did, in fact, 
"have other Transport Agreements with the Irrigation District in the Moore Canal." Id. at p. 55, 
LL. 9-11, R., Vol. 2, p. 309. Instead of utilizing a transport agreement as Sorensen testified he 
knew had historically been used for the delivery of this water right, "No request for a transport 
agreement for this water right has ever been filed with the District by Sorensen." (Emphasis 



























added). Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 43, LL. 4-11., R., Vol. 4, p. 801. The holding in Erickson I is 
particularly appropriate to the facts of the Sorensen water right. A reasonable method has at all 
times historically been available and used for the delivery of that water right. As stated above, 
Sorensen testified that he knew that the water from that well had been delivered via a transport 
agreement. That alternative is still available to Sorensen, just as his water right states, but he 
purposefully chose not to seek a transport agreement in his quest to create a purported legal 
necessity. 
It doesn't matter whether the issue concerns 10 feet, 100 feet or 1000 feet of someone's 
property. The taking of private property by eminent domain is serious business and is harsh in 
nature. Idaho Power Co. v. Lettunich, 100 Idaho 582, 582-3, 602 P.2d 540 (1979). As stated by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266,215 P.2d 812 (1950): 
" ... [I]f there is a way by which the applicant can lawfully reach his 
farm or place of residence, a case of necessity does not exist, 
within the meaning of the Constitution." (Citation omitted). 
" .. , [I]f the applicant's outlet to the highway affords him practical 
access thereto, or can be made so at a reasonable expense, he is not 
entitled to the establishment of the way as a necessity." (Citation 
omitted). 
70 Idaho at 270. That case involved the condemnation of a private access, but the necessity 
issue is the same for an easement by eminent domain as alleged by the Ranchers in this case. 
The Eisenbarth Court stated: 
While, under a statute differently worded from ours, the 
'spirit' of the case supports the thought that if appellant already has 
a reasonably convenient way, he may not condemn another. 
Strawberry Point District Fair Soc., v. Ball, 189 Iowa 605, 177 
N.W. 697 at page 698; see also Garris v. Byrd, 229 N.C. 343, 49 



























S.E.2d 625; Shake v. Frazer, 94 Ky. 143,21 S.W. 583. 
70 Idaho at 270-71. According to the Idaho Supreme Court in Erickson v. Amoth, 112 Idaho 
1122, 739 P.2d 421 (App. 1987) ["Erickson III"]: 
The standard [ of necessity] is the same as that which exists in suits 
for common law easements by necessity. (Citation omitted). 
112 Idaho at 1124. 
As a matter of law, it is apparent that necessity does not exist to support the Ranchers' 
eminent domain cause of action. Because there was no material issue of fact in this regard, 
summary judgment in favor of the Cains should have been entered as to Count Four. This Court 
should reverse the district court on this issue. 
Not only do all the Ranchers' water rights and their respective transfers prescribe that each 
of those rights were acquired and/or transferred on the basis of transport via the Moore Canal, 
each of the Ranchers possessed that transport ability prior to and after the time that the pipeline 
across the Cains' property was constructed in 2009. Mr. Rindfleisch attested to the fact that the 
GW Transport Agreements were all valid during the entirety of 2009, and were only terminated 
beginning in 2010, some six or seven months after the pipeline was operational. Rindfleisch 
Deposition, p. 17, LL. 13-25; p. 18, LL. 1-16, R., Vol. 4, pp. 794-5. Clearly, the Ranchers in this 
case have attempted to create their own necessity by terminating the very agreements that the 
Ranchers' own law fIrm previously demanded of the irrigation district pursuant to the lawsuit 
previously fIled against the District on behalf of PU Ranch. R., Vol. 8, pp. 1469-1474. The 
Ranchers cannot have it both ways. 
In its Order, the district court appeared to embrace the Ranchers' unsupported contention 



























that they would bear the "brunt of stolen water as well as unmeasured or improperly measured 
water diversions," under the GW Transport Agreements. Order at p. 8, R., Vol. 4, p. 681. 
However, there was no evidence of stolen or unmeasured water in the Moore Canal. Mr. 
Rindfleisch attested to the fact that the headgates between the three Ranchers' wells were all 
lockable, that there was no improper water measurement in the Moore Canal, and that he was 
unaware of any ability for water to be stolen out of the Moore Canal. Rindfleisch Deposition, pp. 
32-33, R, Vol. 4, p. 798. Mr. Rindfleisch testified that the "shrinkage" [transport loss] in the 
Moore Canal was uniform, and that the Moore Canal was one of the best canals that the District 
had in terms of maintaining a uniform shrink. Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 35, LL. 11-16, R., Vol. 4, 
p. 799. Simply stated, there was no evidence in the record supporting the Ranchers' 
unsubstantiated, but disputed, assertions in this regard. 
The district court acknowledged that the GW Transport Agreements were permissive, and 
in a footnote, acknowledged the Idaho Supreme Court decision on Erickson 1, supra, in which the 
Court held that a permissive use, such as a license, could obviate the element of necessity in an 
eminent domain proceeding. R, Vol. 4, p. 681.However, the Court further stated: 
The record also reflects that certain conditions imposed by the 
District in its Transport Agreements would be undesirable if not 
unconscionable. Anyone intending to expend significant resources in 
reclaiming arid lands would certainly have to question the wisdom in 
doing so if the only way to irrigate the land was through the District's 
Moore Canal. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at p. 8, R, Vol. 4, p. 681. 
The district court was apparently unaware of the fact that the Ranchers' lands were not 
"arid" lands to be reclaimed as discussed, supra, and as testified to by both Winfield Slocum and 



























Michael Telford. These lands had all been irrigated for at least three decades by virtue of 
Transport Agreements for water delivered through the Moore Canal. The Court is urged to review 
Exhibits "7" through" II", inclusive, of the Deposition of James Rindfleisch. R., Vol. 8, pp. 1363-
1402. Exhibit "7" (R., Vol. 8, pp. 1363-1370) is a blank copy of the District's currently adopted 
form of Transport Agreement. Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 26, LL. 14-22, R., Vol. 4, p. 797. Mr. 
Rindfleisch testified that Exhibit "8" (R., Vol. 8, pp. 1371-1379) was a Transport Agreement for 
Telford's water delivered through the Moore Canal which was executed in 2010 at the very time 
of this litigation. He testified that the language in that document is the same as that which is 
contained in Exhibit "T', and it is still of continuing force and effect. Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 
27, LL. 1-16, R., Vol. 4, p. 797. The interesting thing observed by Mr. Rindfleisch was that the 
described place of use for Telford's water delivered via this Other Transport Agreement is the 
exact same property that was legally described in Exhibit "6" to his deposition, the GW Transport 
Agreement that had been terminated by Telford at the end of2009. Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 27, 
LL. 20-25; p. 28, LL.1-5, R., Vol. 4, p. 797; See also p. 25, LL. 21-25, R., Vol. 4, p. 796; p. 26, 
LL. 1-4, R., Vol. 4, p. 797. If those Agreements were so undesirable and so unconscionable in 
2009, it would have been totally inconsistent for Telford to have executed Exhibit "8" on May 4, 
2010. Exhibit "9" (R., Vol. 8, pp. 1380-1386) to the Rindfleisch deposition is a Transport 
Agreement for PU Ranch's water, and it is no coincidence that the legal description in that 
Transport Agreement matches the one in the GW Transport Agreement that had been terminated 
by PU Ranch at the end of 2009. Rindfleisch Deposition, pp. 28-9, R., Vol. 4, p. 797. According 
to Mr. Rindfleisch, Exhibit "9" is still of continuing full force and effect. !d. Finally, Exhibit "10" 



























(R., Vol. 8, pp. 1387-1395) to his deposition is a Transport Agreement for Mitchell Sorensen that 
is still of continuing force and effect. Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 29, LL. 15-21, R., Vol. 4, p. 797. 
Exhibit It 11" (R., Vol. 8, pp. 1396-1402) is yet another Transport Agreement between the District 
and Telford Lands pertaining to use of the Moore Canal to transport water to Telford's land via the 
Moore Canal. It is still of continuing force and effect. Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 29, LL. 23-25; p. 
30, LL. 1-4, R., Vol. 4, pp. 797-8. It was patently inconsistent for the Ranchers to argue that the 
two GW Transport Agreements they voluntarily chose to terminate were "undesirable if not 
unconscionable," while maintaining the five Other Transport Agreements that were neither 
undesirable nor unconscionable for the irrigation of their same land, and which utilized the Moore 
Canal for water transport. The Court is urged to recall that Rindfleisch confirmed that viable 
transport agreements were in effect at the time the pipeline across the Cains' property was first 
constructed in 2009, and capable of being utilized throughout that entire year. Only at the behest 
of the Ranchers were those two GW Transport Agreements voluntarily terminated for the sake of 
convenience and economic reasons. In accordance with this Court's holding in Erickson 1, supra, 
necessity does not exist if alternative routes are available, even by way of a limited license. There 
was no reason that the BLRID would choose to terminate only the two GW Transport Agreements 
through the Moore Canal, while leaving the Ranchers' five other Other Transport Agreements 
intact. The evidence shows that the BLRID was ready, willing and able to continue to transport 
the Ranchers' water rights through the Moore Canal because it continues to have sufficient 
capacity. Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 37, LL. 10-23, R., Vol. 4, p. 799; p. 38, LL. 9-16, R., Vol. 4, 
p. 800. Even the district court found it likely that the BLRID would transport the Ranchers' water. 



























R., Vol. 4., p. 681. Cains reassert that the Ranchers' arguments were nothing more than a ruse in 
order for them to assert a claim of necessity. On appeal, this Court should reject the Ranchers' 
contentions and reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on the eminent domain 
issue. Eminent domain is far too harsh and far too invasive a remedy to justify allowing the 
Ranchers to make up facts to support their case for the sake of convenience. 
The notes in the Harris Affidavit acknowledged the need to "terminate existing GW 
[Transport Agreements]," as part of the Ranchers' plan, most likely to substantiate their claim of 
necessity. R., Vol. 3, p. 447. Those notes contained a further acknowledgement that the GW 
Transport Agreements would remain in place even after the pipeline was constructed, and would 
"sunset on their own @ end of this year." R., Vol. 3, p. 450. The thrust of the Ranchers' argument 
was that the GW Transport Agreements were permissive, but that simply wasn't good enough for 
them. Tr., 10113/2010 at p. 65, L1. 16-23, p. 67, L1. 19-24. As expressly argued by the Ranchers: 
Permission is not an option. We need to have our own property 
rights to give us the security that we need. 
Tr., 10/13/2010 at p. 82, L1. 16-17. In other words, even though the Ranchers' original water 
rights and their approved transfers contained the condition that water was to be transported via the 
Moore Diversion [the Moore Canal], and even though that had worked for thirty (30) or more 
years to allow the development of the Ranchers' property, it was subjectively deemed insufficient 
by them for their purposes in the future. 
There was apparently much acrimony between Sorensen and BLRlD regarding past 
interactions. Sorensen stated in his deposition that the District would never give him a Transport 
Agreement, and that Rick Reynolds, the former Chairman of the BLRlD Board, told him that he 



























[Sorensen] was "going to go to hell" and that he [Sorensen] was the cause of Reynolds' farm 
failure. Sorensen Deposition, pp. 47-48, R., Vol. 2, p. 307. Mr. Reynolds disagreed with Mr. 
Sorensen's recollections, and flatly denied making any of the statements attributed to him by Mr. 
Sorensen. His Affidavit discloses that he was but one member of the Board, and even if he had 
been personally opposed to a transport agreement for Mr. Sorensen, the Board would have made 
the decision in that regard. He acknowledged that transport agreements were advantageous to the 
Board and the BLRID if its canals had sufficient capacity to transport water rights of landowners 
such as Sorensen. R., Vol. 2, p. 378-9. Consistent with the deposition testimony of James 
Rindfleisch, Sorensen was forced to admit that he does indeed have a Transport Agreement with 
BLRID in the Moore Canal. Sorensen Deposition, p. 55, LL. 9-11, R., Vol. 2, p. 309. So much for 
Sorensen's paranoia that he could never obtain a Transport Agreement from the BLRID. When 
asked if he had ever submitted a request to the BLRID for a Transport Agreement for his .S cfs 
groundwater right diverted from the Old Moss Well, he admitted he had never even submitted 
such an application. Id at p. 56, LL. 20-25, R., Vol. 2, p. 309. Rindfleisch confirmed that fact in 
his deposition. Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 29, LL. 15-21, R., Vol. 4, p. 797. He further 
acknowledged that no request for a Transport Agreement had ever been submitted by Sorensen for 
his groundwater right in the past four years during which he had been employed with the District. 
Id at p. 43, LL. 6-11, R., Vol. 4, p. SOL More importantly, he testified that there was no reason 
why the District would not approve a Transport Agreement for Sorensen's groundwater rights, 
Telford's groundwater rights or PU Ranch's groundwater rights in the Moore Canal. Id at p. 62, 
LL. 14-25, p. 63, LL. 1-17., R., Vol. 4, p. S06. He testified that the GW Transport Agreements 



























were terminated at the behest of Telford and PU Ranch, and that there was no reason why the 
District would want to have terminated them because of the revenue the District received under 
the GW Transport Agreements. Id at p. 19, LL. 1-19, R., VoL 4, p. 795. 
The Transport Agreements used by the BLRlD have been modified over the years, but 
their basic premise has remained the same. BLRlD would transport a landowner's water rights in 
exchange for receiving compensation. The Ranchers argued that the GW Transport Agreements 
were a contract of adhesion, and nigh onto an abomination, and the district court apparently 
agreed with their assertions. The district court stated the following in its Memorandum Decision 
and Order: 
Additionally, use of the Canal as a delivery system would be 
permissive only.1 While the evidence establishes that it is likely 
the District would agree to transport water to Plaintiffs, there 
would be no assurance or certainty that the District would 
continuously transport via the Canal. The record also reflects that 
certain conditions imposed by the District in its transport agreements 
would be undesirable if not unconscionable. Anyone intending to 
expend significant resources in reclaiming arid lands would certainly 
have to question the wisdom in doing so if the only way to irrigate 
the land was through the District's Moore CanaL 
(Emphasis added). R., VoL 4, p. 681. The court's footnote acknowledged that the permissive 
nature of the use of the Moore Canal would not establish necessity, and cited the Erickson I case. 
That being the case, the Cains believe the court committed error in reaching its decision on the 
issue of necessity. Furthermore, the court failed to acknowledge that the Ranchers possessed the 
"Other Transport Agreements" which were, in some cases, identical to the terminated GW 
Transport Agreements. How could the district court have found that the GW Transport 
Agreements were so egregious as to be unconscionable, yet the Other Transport Agreements were 



























deemed to be totally acceptable? 
Finally, the court focused on the expenditure of significant resources in reclaiming arid 
lands in its decision. Two things are noteworthy. First, the Ranchers' lands are not "arid" lands; 
their land had all been developed and irrigated for thirty or more years. The Ranchers' attorney 
suggested that his own clients may have unwisely relied on a permissive use when they developed 
their property (Tr., 10/13/2010 at p. 67, LL. 20-24), but the point cannot be lost that permissive 
use through the GW Transport Agreements with the BLRID has met the Ranchers' requirements 
for decades. [Given that Telford purchased its land in 2007, it is apparent that Telford was not the 
one who developed the 1985 acres of irrigated land that it purchased from Mickelsen.] 
It seems clear that the Ranchers attempted to create their own necessity by insisting on 
termination ofthe GW Transport Agreements, while leaving their Other Transport Agreements in 
the Moore Canal unaffected by their Settlement Agreement. The Ranchers' admission that the 
need for a joint project among the three of them was necessary because otherwise it would have 
been cost prohibitive should be viewed with incredulity. As stated by the Ranchers in their own 
discovery responses, the pipeline would have been economically unfeasible if all three didn't 
participate. R., Vol. 8, p. 1453. In other words, the Ranchers would had to have continued with 
the GW Transport Agreements if all three of them didn't elect to go along with the plan because 
"it would have been cost-prohibitive." Tr., 10/13/2010 at p. 69, LL. 18-22. Telford similarly 
attempted to justify necessity based solely on economic reasons, because he used the Burnett Well 
located west of Highway 93, and did not run his water through the Cains' property. He testified 
that he needed partners to help defray the cost of the pipeline project. Telford Deposition, p. 22, 



























LL. 1-21, R., Vol. 2, p. 321. 
The Cains contend that the Ranchers should not have been allowed to manipulate Idaho's 
laws of eminent domain in order to create an alleged necessity in order to obtain a more 
convenient means of delivery of their water rights. It is facially apparent that sanctioning this 
conduct could lead to numerous abuses of the statute. The district court's decision on the issue of 
eminent domain should be reversed. 
C. Did the Ranchers' actions of placing their pipeline across the Cains' property 
without compliance with relevant Idaho statutes constitute a trespass? 
Stated succinctly, the Ranchers trespassed on the Cains' property when they ran a 
pipeline through the property without the consent and the grant of an easement by the Cains. 
The Cains assert that such action clearly constituted a trespass, i.e., the wrongful interference 
with the right of exclusive possession of their real property. Moon v. North Idaho Farmers 
Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536, 96 P.3d 637 (2004). Trespass comprehends an actual physical invasion by 
tangible matter. Id 
More than 100 years ago, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed a fact situation where a 
water company wanted to place a dam that would inundate a landowner's property. In Ryan v. 
Weiser Valley Land & Water Co., 20 Idaho 288, 118 P. 769 (1911), the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated: 
Considerable has been said in this case about the value of the 
respondent's land and the comparative damage and injuries that 
would be inflicted as between the land owner on the one side and the 
water company and the water consumers on the other. No question 
of valuation can enter into a case where a man is the absolute owner 
of a tract of land and is seeking to obtain or protect the possession 
and occupation of the same as against a trespasser who shows no 



























right thereto. In such a case, it becomes a plain and simple 
proposition of protecting property rights. We have endeavored in a 
long line of cases in this state to make it so plain that everyone may 
know and understand that property rights in Idaho are sacred, and 
that it does not make a particle of difference whether it be of the 
value of a dollar or a million, it must, in the ultimate judgment of the 
court, all amount to the same thing in the matter of its protection and 
preservation to its owner. 
In La Veine v. Stack-Gibbs Lumber Co., 17 Idaho 51, 134 
Am.St. 253, 104 P. 666, we had occasion to consider this question as 
it was sought to be applied to a land owner, and in dealing with a 
lumber company which had entered upon the lands of another 
without right or authority, and said: 
"They should be required to respect the private rights 
of property just the same as anyone else, and the fact that 
they owned lumber about Lake Fernan or millions of feet of 
logs floating in the lake furnishes no reason, pretext or 
excuse whatever for their turning trespassers and wrongdoers 
themselves and riding over the rights of others. The fact that 
appellant's land may not be of any particular value for 
agriculture or any other purpose has nothing to do with the 
case. It is plaintiffs land, and he had a right to use it as he 
pleases and to exclude everyone else. The mere plea of 
convenience gives them no legal standing. If it did, a man's 
property rights would never be safe or secure." 
20 Idaho at 297-8. The Court's statement in that case is unquestionably applicable to the fact 
situation in this case. The district court in this case also seemed to weigh the relative benefit and 
burden of the easement, and concluded that its location was "logical and reasonable." R., Vol. 4, 
p. 682. That, however, did not make it legally necessary. All the Cains ever wanted was to be left 
alone and secure in their property rights. Instead, the Ranchers simply took what they wanted, and 
when Mr. Cain became aware of, and objected to the installation of the pipeline on his property, 
they offered him a pittance, and told him that ifhe wouldn't agree to what they offered, they would 



























take it from him by eminent domain. Cain Affidavit, R., VoL 1, p. 24, ~ 11. Mr. Cain further 
stated in his Affidavit that at no time prior to the installation of the pipeline across his property did 
the Ranchers, or anyone acting on their behalf, ever make any attempt to engage in good faith 
negotiations with him. Id at R., VoL 1, p. 25, ~ 17. 
In Hutchins, The Idaho Law of Water Rights, 13-17 (1956), Wells Hutchins discussed 
trespass upon land as vitiating a water right issued by the state engineer. He stated: 
The fact that a party holds a water right does not mean that he has, 
because of that fact, the right to enter the lands of others for the 
purpose of constructing ditches across them. That easement and 
right-of-way must be obtained either by purchase or condemnation, 
or by adverse user. 
Id at pp. 15-16. Hutchins cited Swank v. Sweetwater Irrigation & Power Co., Ltd, 15 Idaho 353, 
360, 98 P. 297 (1908) for that proposition. In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
The fact that a party has a water right gives him no right to enter the 
lands of others for the purpose of constructing ditches and canals 
across them, except over public lands of the United States. He must 
obtain that easement and right-of-way either by purchase or 
condemnation. 
15 Idaho at 360. Hutchins further discussed Marshall v. Niagra Springs Orchard Co., Ltd, 22 
Idaho 144, 125 P. 208 (1912). That case dealt with the entry upon lands for purposes of 
investigating, inspecting and the making of surveys for purposes of making an application for a 
permit. The Court stated: 
The right to enter the land of the appellant, therefore, should have 
been secured from the appellant, either by an agreement of the 
parties, or by condemnation proceedings, and without such remedy 
being pursued, the respondent in making such entry would be a 
trespasser. 



























22 Idaho at 153. Continuing, the Court stated: 
Id at 154. 
The constitution and laws of this state specifically recognize the right 
to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural 
stream to a beneficial use, and that such right shall never be denied, 
but this does not mean that a person is given a right to go upon 
private property of another for the purpose of making an 
appropriation, without the license or consent of the owner, or before 
such right is given by proceedings for condemnation. 
Finally, the Court stated as follows: 
Mr. Wiel, in his third edition of Water Rights in Western 
States, vol. 1, chap. 10, discusses this question generally, and the 
decisions of the courts of several states and the federal courts passing 
upon this question have been collected. In the text the author recites 
the different rules that have been announced by the various 
decisions, and from such discussion it clearly appears that the weight 
of authority and better reasoning is with the proposition that an 
appropriation of water at a point upon private land cannot be made 
by trespass, and that where an attempt is made to initiate the right to 
appropriate the public water of the state by trespass upon private 
property, such initiation of such right is void as against the owner of 
the land. Applying this rule to the facts of this case, an action to 
condemn a portion of the land of appellant for the purpose of using 
the same as a power site cannot be maintained because no water 
right has been legally acquired which would make necessary the use 
of said land. This necessarily results from the fact that the water right 
was initiated by trespass. (Prentice v. McKay, 38 Mont. 114, 98 P. 
1081; Smith v. Denniff, 24 Mont. 20, 81 Am.St. 408, 60 P. 398, 50 
L.R.A. 741; Curtis v. La Grande Water Co., 20 Or. 34, 12 P. 808,25 
P. 378, 10 L.R.A. 484; Mud Creek Irr. A & M Co. v. Vivian, 74 Tex. 
170, 11 S.W. 1078). 
Id at 154-5. In Wiel, Water Rights in Western States § 221 (3 fd Ed. 1911), the author discussed at 
length the issue of rights-of-way on private land. In concluding that portion of his treatise, Mr. 
Wielobserved: 
In no jurisdiction can rights-of-way be appropriated over private land 



























against the landowner's protest (except by grant, condemnation or 
prescription). 
Id at § 233, p. 260. In this case, it is evident that the Ranchers were trespassers when they went on 
the Cains' property and installed their pipeline without permission or without the institution of 
condemnation proceedings resulting in a judicial determination that an easement could be taken. 
In reversing the district court's decision on the summary judgment as to eminent domain, the 
Court should also determine that relief should be afforded to Cains on the trespass issue as 
asserted in their Counterclaim. 
D. If the Ranchers' property, and their water rights, were fully developed prior to the 
time of the pipeline installation on the Cains' property, were the Ranchers entitled to 
exercise the private right of eminent domain? 
If, as the court observed in Canyon View, the private right of eminent domain may be 
utilized for the irrigation and reclamation of arid lands, it is apparent that the Ranchers should 
never have asserted their claim in the first place. 
As stated above, PU Ranch and Telford Lands, LLC had been irrigating their property 
with their water rights for at least the past three decades. The Ranchers cited the case of Canyon 
View, supra, for the proposition that "the irrigation and reclamation of arid lands is a well 
recognized public use" in order to invoke eminent domain. According to 11. Rodale, The Synonym 
Finder 56 (1961), "arid" means "dry, without moisture, waterless, bare and uncultivable." When 
asked in his deposition if he was aware that the PU Ranch property had been historically irrigated 
with pivots, Winfield Scott Slocum V testified that it had all been irrigated. Slocum Deposition, p. 
12, LL. 17-19 and p. 13, LL. 10-25, R., Vol. 4, p. 773. Winfield Scott Slocum V testified in his 
deposition that he had observed that practice when he was 15 or 20 years old (Slocum Deposition, 



























p. 13, LL. 10-15, R., Vol. 4, p. 773), and that he was now 35 years old. Slocum Deposition, p. 4, 
LL.II-12, R., Vol. 4, p. 771. Despite being the relatively sophisticated president of a California 
construction company, as well as the owner of a California property management company, 
Winfield Scott Slocum V testified that he did not know the meaning of the term "arid". Slocum 
Deposition, p. 14, LL. 1-7, R., Vol. 4, p. 774. When asked if he understood the term "arid", his 
attorney objected to the question as calling for a legal conclusion. Id. Reluctantly, Mr. Slocum 
admitted that the PU Ranch land had been irrigated annually by the diversion of water into the 
Moore Canal, and that the land was indeed watered. Slocum Deposition, p. 14, LL. 14-15, R., Vol. 
4, p. 774. It is obvious that the Ranchers' irrigated land was not arid in 2009, and had not been arid 
for decades. 
E. Was the Ranchers' Complaint facially deficient under the provisions of Title 7 of 
the Idaho Code for multiple reasons, including its failure to specifically describe the 
easement claimed by the Ranchers? 
Idaho Code § 7-702(2) describes an easement as "an estate or right in land that is subject 
to taking for a public use." Idaho Code § 7-707(5) requires a description of each piece of land 
sought to be taken. In Ada County Highway Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888, 26 P.3d 1225 CAppo 
2001), the Court stated: 
Idaho Code § 7-707 requires that the land sought to be 
condemned be specifically described in the complaint .... " 
135 Idaho at 891. The Ranchers' Complaint did not contain a legal description of the easement, 
which ultimately led the Ranchers to file their Motion to Amend Complaint on October 5, 2011 
(R., Vol. 6, p. 1088), five days after the Final Judgment and Order were entered. R., Vol. 6, p. 
1078. Even the Ranchers' own appraiser whose appraisal was submitted to the district court 



























acknowledged that the actual size ofthe easement was unknown. R., VoL 5, p. 916. 
Idaho Code § 7-707(7) provides the mandatory statement of the requisite good faith 
negotiation to purchase the condemnee's property prior to instituting the action. The Ranchers' 
Complaint acknowledged that the Cains resided in Butte County, Idaho. R, Vol. 8, p. 1275, ~ 4. 
The Ranchers further asserted in their Complaint that they had undertaken the requisite good faith 
negotiations with the Cains. ld at p. 1283, ~ 51. The problem for the Ranchers, of course, is that 
their alleged "good faith negotiations" occurred at a point in time some number of months after 
they had already taken the Cains' property for their own use. The Idaho Supreme Court stated the 
following inState v. Bair, 83 Idaho 475, 365 P.2d 216 (1961): 
However, on the new trial, it must be kept in mind that the 
requirements of I.e. § 7-707(6) are not to be lightly regarded, and 
must be satisfied before an action in eminent domain may be 
entertained. 
83 Idaho at 480. 
The delicate wording of the Ranchers' Complaint in this regard totally ignored the 
constitutional notion of due process and the determination of compensation before any taking can 
occur. 
In addition to the fact that there was no legal description of the estate sought to be taken, 
and no evidence of any good faith negotiations between the parties prior to the time of the taking, 
the Cains were left to wonder why the Ranchers' Complaint requested relief "determining that 
Twin Lakes is entitled to take the easement for the Pipeline subject to payment by Twin Lakes to 
Defendants of just compensation for the easement." R, VoL 8, p. 1285, ~ 4. 
The Cains contend that even if the Ranchers had legitimately been entitled to proceed 



























under a theory of private eminent domain, their Complaint was deficient for a number of reasons, 
and the court's decision would have to be reversed. Of course, the Cains have contended all along 
that necessity never existed under Idaho Code § 7-704(2), and that the decision of the district 
court should be reversed on that basis as well. 
F. Did the district court err in failing to dismiss Telford Lands, LLC as a party to this 
litigation? 
Michael Telford, as the designee for Telford Lands, LLC, was deposed in this case on July 
12, 2010. When asked about the point of diversion for its water rights, the following colloquy 
took place: 
Q. Which wells, as shown on Deposition Exhibit 1 





The Burnett Well. 
So it's the one -
West of the highway. 
Telford Deposition, p. 21, LL. 22-25, p. 22, LL. 1-2, R., VoL 2, p. 321. Continuing, Telford 
Lands, LLC acknowledged that its only interest or involvement in the east side of the highway 
was having partners to defray the cost of building a small canal inside the DC Canal. Id Clearly 
and simply, Telford Lands, LLC was not a real party in interest, and had no basis to assert a claim 
to a permanent easement across upstream lands to the east when its water only flowed west ofDS 
Highway 93. 
The maintenance of this action by Telford Lands, LLC, and the attendant costs the Cains 
incurred as a result of the involvement of Telford, were unwarranted. Telford Lands, LLC should 
have been dismissed as a matter of law based upon its own deposition testimony. According to the 



























Idaho Supreme Court in Citibank, (South Dakota), NA. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254, 220 PJd 1073 
(2009): 
A real party in interest is "one who has a real, actual, material, or 
substantial interest in the subject matter of the action." (Citation 
omitted). . .. However, where real-party-in-interest status has been 
made mandatory by statute or rule, as it has in Idaho, real-party-in-
interest status must be demonstrated before a suit can proceed. 
(Citation omitted). Generally, the holder of legal title to the subject 
matter of a cause of action is a real party in interest. 
220 P.3d at 1077. That Telford Lands, LLC is the holder oflegal title to its water rights was never 
disputed by the Cains. What was disputed was Telford's standing because those water rights are 
diverted entirely from a well located on the west side of Highway 93, and the Cains' property is 
located entirely on the east side of Highway 93. Even the district court acknowledged that 
"Telford's property is west and downstream from Plaintiffs [sic - Defendants Cains]" and that 
"Telford's wells are also west of the Defendants' property." R., VoL 4, pp. 677-8. Telford had no 
standing, and was not a real party in interest such that it could claim an easement over and across 
the lands of the Cains. 
As noted above, the Ranchers admitted that economic feasibility was the motivation for 
Telford's role in getting his neighbors to buy into the pipeline project. 
Without all three partners involved, the project would not have 
been undertaken as the participation of all three individuals/entities 
was necessary to make the project economically feasible. 
R, Vol. 8, p. 1453. The Ranchers' own admission against interest in this regard is telling, and 
can only mean one thing. The entire pipeline project would never have been undertaken, and the 
GW Transport Agreements would still continue to be used until this very day had Telford not 



























instigated the project and fulfilled his "bulldog" role. Given Telford's well location on the west 
side of US Highway 93, and given that Telford owned approximately 87% of the water rights 
and the combined place of use of the Ranchers' water rights, there was no reason or need for 
Telford to join forces with PU Ranch and Sorensen to seek an easement across the Cains' 
property upstream from him. 
In the Ranchers' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Telford Lands, LLC, 
the Ranchers sought to justify Telford's involvement in the litigation on the basis of a drought-
related two-year temporary lease pursuant to a Water Supply Bank Rental Agreement. R., Vol. 
2, pp. 402-3. The mere fact that someone holds a temporary lease from the state's water supply 
bank does not give rise to the private power of eminent domain. 
The Court should also take note of the terms of the Water Supply Bank Rental 
Agreement for Water Right No. 34-7092 identified as being the rented water right to be pumped 
by Telford from the Old Moss Well. A copy of that document was appended as an exhibit to the 
Affidavit of Robert L. Harris dated September 29, 2010, and is contained in the Record at R., 
Vol. 4, pp. 429-431. On the first of three pages, Michael Telford, signing as the managing 
member of Telford Lands, LLC, signed a statement which reads: 
The undersigned renter agrees to use the water rented under this 
agreement in accordance with the Water Supply Bank rules and in 
compliance with the limitations and conditions of use described 
in this agreement: 
(Emphasis added). In the "CONDITIONS OF WATER USE", set forth in paragraph 3 on the 
second page, the following is stated: 
Use of water under this Agreement is subject to the limitations and 
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1 
2 conditions of approval of the specified water right. 
3 Although certain information was attached to that Affidavit regarding Water Right No. 34-
4 7092, it appears that a page was inadvertently omitted, because the first line contains an 
5 incomplete sentence, and states only, "irrigation of 2124 acres." R., Vol. 4, p. 416. The next 
6 
numbered paragraph is "3", with paragraphs 1 and 2 having been omitted. Although paragraphs 
7 
8 
1 and 2 are not important to this discussion, it is the title of those numbered paragraphs that is 
9 
important. The title of those numbered paragraphs was labeled as "CONDITIONS OF 
10 APPROVAL" of the water right leased pursuant to the Water Supply Bank Lease. The complete 
11 information regarding Water Right No. 34-7092 is contained in the Record at R., Vol. 4, p. 662. 
12 The tenth Condition of Approval for that right states: 
13 
10. Water delivered through the Moore Diversion and 
14 Timberdome Canal. 
15 The Water Supply Bank Rental Agreement, on its face, required compliance with the 
16 "conditions of approval of the specified water right." 
17 
In any event, the Water Supply Bank Rental Agreement was for a term of two years, and 
18 
19 
it expired by its terms on October 15, 2011. The Cains are unaware of any legal precedent that 
20 
would authorize a tenant with a lease for a term of years to institute eminent domain 
21 proceedings in order to obtain a permanent easement on another's property. The district court 
22 took a different position and found that the temporary lease from the State Water Bank was 
23 sufficient to confer standing upon Telford. R., Vol. 4, p. 678. Cains contend that this decision 
24 
was clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
25 
26 
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2 G. Was it an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court to deny costs and 

























The Cains submitted their Memorandum for Fees and Costs in the total amount of 
$54,362.15. R., Vol. 6, p. 1117-25. Fees were sought pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-718, Idaho 
Code § 12-121, and applicable Idaho case law as set forth in the Affidavit in Support of 
Defendants' Memorandum for Fees and Costs. R., Vol. 6, pp. 1126-29. Cains identified Idaho 
case law supporting a discretionary award of attorney fees to a condemnee as set forth in Ada 
Co. Highway District v. Acarregui, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983) and Erickson v. Amoth, 
112 Idaho 1122, 739 P.2d 421 (App. 1987). The Ranchers also sought an award of costs and 
attorney fees. R., Vol. 6, pp. 1130-88. 
The district court determined that there was "no overall prevailing party in this action," 
and therefore denied an award of costs and attorney fees to either party. R., Vol. 7, p. 1255. 
I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(1)(B) sets forth the factors to be considered by a court. 




the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief 
sought; 
whether there were multiple claims or issues between the 
parties; and 
the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of 
the claims or issues. 
Although perceiving the issue as one of discretion, the Cains contend that Judge Tingey 
acted outside the boundaries of such discretion given his reasons for a denial of fees in their 
favor. 



























While normally the trial court's award of attorney fees is accorded 
a great degree of deference as being within its unique expertise and 
discretion (citation omitted), we cannot sustain such an award 
where the record itself discloses that the claim was not frivolously 
pursued. 
JMF. Trucking, Inc. v. Carburetor and Electric of Lewiston, Inc., 113 Idaho 797, 799, 748 
P.2d 381 (1987). The same must presumably be true for a trial court's denial of an award of 
attorney fees when the law and facts are as set forth herein. Cains assert that the reasons for the 
trial court's denial of fees should not be sustained by this Court on appeal based upon the 
following argument. 
The Ranchers filed their action against the Cains alleging the aforementioned multiple 
counts one year after they had already taken the Cains' property for their private purposes. The 
Ranchers clearly had no entitlement to fIrst trespass on the Cains' property, and then institute a 
condemnation action after waiting a year. Such a process was totally inconsistent with the 
provisions of Title 7 of the Idaho Code regarding eminent domain, and it seems clear that their 
case was brought and pursued frivolously and unreasonably, and without legal foundation. This 
Court will necessarily be guided by legal precedent already established by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. The Ranchers cited the district court to Ada Co. Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 
873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983), in support of their claim for fees. In reference to Acarrequi, the 
Ranchers attempted to categorize their case as a "most extreme and unlikely situation" in which 
to justify a claim for their attorney fees as condemnors. In Acarrequi, supra, the Idaho Supreme 
Court stated: 
Except in the most extreme and unlikely situation, we cannot 
envision an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a condemnor. 



























105 Idaho at 878. 
The Court is urged to recall that in Acarrequi, supra, the condemnor filed its complaint 
and sought the court's order on condemnation before taking possession of the property, a matter 
consistent with the mandatory provisions of the eminent domain statutes of Idaho. In the instant 
case, the three Ranchers simply took what they wanted the old-fashioned way, and only when 
the Cains learned of and objected to the expropriation of their property did the Ranchers ever 
offer any settlement with the Cains. The Court is urged to recall that the Ranchers attempted 
this same type of behavior with the BLRID's right-of-way when they installed a pipeline in its 
right-of-way without the consent of the BLRID. After having been given the boot by the 
BLRID, the Ranchers simply went about their business and took the Cains' property without 
any easement or agreement. 
The instant case certainly did not present lithe most extreme and unlikely situation" 
insofar as an award of fees to the condemnors is concerned. However, from the Cains' 
perspective, the fact that the Ranchers first took the property interest they wanted, and then filed 
a condemnation action a year later, did present an "extreme and unlikely situation" which 
compelled an award of fees to the Cains. Even in a "quick-take" condemnation proceeding, a 
condemning authority is statutorily required to obtain a judicial order of possession before it is 
entitled to take the property of another. 
The following statements are quoted from A carre qui, supra, and should be applicable to 
the facts of this case. 
On the other hand, the condemnee, as was emphasized by 



























the trial court here, has done nothing to bring the action upon 
himself except to have the bad (or good) fortune of owning 
property which the governmental entity has chosen to expropriate. 
105 Idaho at 878. 
The Ranchers first took the Cains' property and then asserted claims to it upon multiple 
theories, each of which failed at the district court except for the eminent domain claim. The 
courts of this state have long recognized the right of a condemnee to reasonably put the 
condemnor to his proof as to the necessity issue, without regard to the issue of the ultimate 
award of monetary damages. In fact, in Erickson 111, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
Furthermore, condemnation is a uniquely unilateral cause of action. 
The defendant is hailed into court, not because he allegedly 
breached a contract duty or committed a tortious act, but because 
of the fortuitous circumstance that someone - be it the government 
or a private citizen - asserts the need to make a "public" use of his 
land. The defendant's property rights must yield to the public use, 
so long as just compensation is paid. Art. 1, § 14, Idaho 
Constitution. Accarequi simply holds that if the defendant 
reasonably puts the condemnor to his proof, but fails to 
prevent the condemnation, he still may be entitled to costs and 
fees in the discretion of the trial court. 
(Emphasis added). 112 Idaho at 1127. If the Ranchers had had it their way, the Cains would 
simply have acceded to their actions in taking their property. Not unlike anyone else, the Cains 
argued to the court that their private property was unique and special to them, and that they did 
not want to suffer the invasion of their property. They advanced a legitimate argument that 
necessity did not exist, and although the district court may not have agreed with them, they 
were still justified in putting the condemnors to their proof on the issue. They were the 
prevailing parties with regard to Counts 1 through 3 of the Ranchers' Complaint. Even if 



























condemnation was found to be a legitimate claim [which it was not], the Cains should still have 
been awarded their costs and attorney fees. 
Neither meaning nor intending any disrespect to Judge Tingey, the Cains assert that the 
court's decision constituted an abuse of discretion that must be reversed on appeal. 
H. Should the Cains be awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.A.R 
Rules 40 and 41, Idaho Code § 12-121, and applicable Idaho case law, including Ada 
County Highway District v. Acarregui, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983) and Erickson 
v. Amoth, 112 Idaho 1122, 739 P.2d 421 (App. 1987)? 
For all the reasons advanced in the foregoing issue, the Cains assert that they shouid be 
awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. In 
awarding attorney fees on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court stated the following in Everett v. 
Trunnell, 105 Idaho 787, 673 P.2d 387 (1983): 
However, how the trial court exercised his discretion below 
is not controlling on this Court's determination of whether or not 
this appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably and without 
foundation. (Citation omitted). 
105 Idaho at 791. The Ranchers commenced their construction on the basis of some sort of 
alleged oral easement, or some sort of alleged permission ostensibly obtained by Boyd Burnett 
to run a pipeline in the Moore Canal through the BLRID culvert. This purported grant of 
permission, which the district court found entirely disingenuous, had nothing to do with the 
Ranchers' subsequent relocation of the pipeline out of the canal right-of-way onto property 
owned by the Cains. The notes appended to the Harris Affidavit clearly evidence that the 
Ranchers knew they needed perpetual easements to protect themselves. Boyd Burnett indicated 
that he had told Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Telford that Mr. Cain "didn't want to have to sign an 



























easement." Burnett Deposition, p. 56, LL. 24-25, R., Vol. 2, p. 345. Additionally, Sorensen 
testified, "It was apparent to us that we needed to secure easements from property owners as we 
commenced this project and so we determined who we would send to which property owners." 
Sorensen Deposition, p. 7, LL. 14-17, R., Vol. 2, p. 297. The Ranchers clearly tried to 
appropriate the BLRID property to their own use when they installed the pipeline in the Moore 
Canal and then ran the pipeline through BLRID's culvert under Highway 93. When that attempt 
to help themselves to someone else's property failed in that regard, the Ranchers simply opted 
to install their pipeline onto the Cains' property, and then considered their failure to obtain any 
easement to be a simple "oversight". For people who knew that they needed a perpetual 
easement to protect themselves in this case, the Ranchers' attitude about using the Cains' 
property as they saw fit is more than outlandish. 
We didn't even consider the fact that it was a problem to just move 
over and go through. 
Telford Deposition, p. 35, 1. 25, p. 36, LL. 1-2, R, Vol. 2, p. 324. From the very outset, the 
Ranchers' conduct amounted to nothing short of a trespass on the Cains' property. The notion 
that an eminent domain proceeding should be initiated on the facts of this case was entirely 
frivolous. The district court certainly found that Counts One, Two and Three of the Ranchers' 
Complaint had no legal merit. The institution of an eminent domain proceeding a year after the 
property had been appropriated to the Ranchers' use was equally devoid of merit. 
While it is true that this case involves a 1 OO-foot wide parcel of land, it should not make 
any difference insofar as Idaho jurisprudence is concerned. Mr. Cain made it clear that he did 
not "want to sign an easement," and that "he didn't want to sell the property." Burnett 



























Deposition, p. 22, LL. 16-24, R., Vol. 2, p. 337. Mr. Cain reaffirmed his position in that regard 
when asked why he offered to sell the Ranchers an easement for the "ridiculous" price of 
$150,000. When asked ifthat offer was "a little ridiculous," Cain responded: 
It was no more ridiculous than taking my land, but I really didn't 
want to sell it. 
Cain Deposition, p. 197, LL. 5-18, R., Vol. 3, p. 521. If the Court reverses the district court's 
decision, the Cains should be entitled to recover their costs and attorney fees on appeal under 
all theories set forth herein. In State v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318, 940 P.2d 1137 (1997), this 
Court considered the State's appeal of an award of attorney fees to a condemnee. In that case, 
the Court affIrmed the trial court's award of attorney fees to Jardine, and awarded Jardine costs 
and fees on appeal. The Jardine court cited Acarregui, supra, for the factors to consider in 
deciding whether to award attorney fees, one of which was that !fA condemnor should have 
reasonably made a timely offer of settlement of at least 90 per cent of the ultimate jury 
verdict." (Emphasis added). 130 Idaho at 320. Obviously, a "timely offer of settlement" is one 
that is made to a condemnee prior to the time that litigation is instituted and property is taken 
for the alleged public use. Any interpretation other than that would be inconsistent with Article 
I, § 14 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code § 7-721. 
Even if this Court were to affirm the taking of the Cains' private property by the 
Ranchers under this strained set of facts, the Cains should still be awarded costs and attorney 
fees on appeal pursuant to Ada Co. Highway District v. Acarregui, supra; Erickson III, supra; 
and Jardine, supra. 




























Everything in this case points to the fact that the Ranchers manufactured their own 
alleged necessity in order to utilize the eminent domain statutes of Idaho to justify their actions. 
Everything had been working according to the conditions of approval in the Ranchers' water 
rights until Telford purchased its almost 2000 acres of land from Mickelsen in 2007. The self-
proclaimed bulldog sought a more convenient and efficient way to obtain delivery of his water, 
and he wasn't about to let anyone stand in his way. Unfortunately for him and his other two 
compatriots, the BLRID proved to be a more formidable adversary than they had anticipated. 
Apparently sensing that the Cains wouldn't be aware of what they were doing, or that they 
couldn't afford to defend their property, the Ranchers simply invaded the Cains' property. When 
the Cains' objection became known, the Ranchers threatened eminent domain, and ultimately 
made good on their threat. 
The GW Transport Agreements were at all times available to the Ranchers in 2009, 
when they began using the pipeline. Even Judge Tingey acknowledged that the evidence 
established that it was likely that the BLRID would agree to transport the Ranchers' water. R., 
VoL 4, p. 681. The BLRID Manager expressed that there was no reason why the BLRID would 
ever have wanted to have those GW Transport Agreements terminated because they provided 
revenue to the District. Rick Reynolds, the former BLRID president, stated in his Affidavit that 
there was adequate capacity to transport the Ranchers' groundwater rights as had been done in 
the past. Nonetheless, Telford and PU Ranch sought the termination of their two GW Transport 
Agreements, while preserving five of their Other Transport Agreements. Mitchell Sorensen 



























opted not to apply for a Transport Agreement for his groundwater right for 40 acres, and 
asserted that he was so reviled by BLRID that he would never get a Transport Agreement. 
However, his sworn deposition testimony in that regard was contradicted by him, and he 
appeared to ignore the fact that he currently has a Transport Agreement in the Moore Canal 
with the BLRID. 
The broad implications of this case for the state of Idaho cannot be overstated. If 
someone possesses an easement or license for access or for the delivery of irrigation water, can 
the grantor and grantee of the easement, or the licensor and licensee of the license, simply agree 
between themselves to terminate that interest so as to afford the grantee or licensee the ability to 
claim necessity in order to condemn a more convenient or easier route? The answer clearly has 
to be in the negative. 
The Cains are inclined to agree with Scott Reed's analysis as set forth at the outset of 
their argument. The need for private condemnation actions no longer exists in a situation where 
lands have been fully developed. This is not a case where the easement grantor or licensor 
unilaterally opted to terminate an interest which could admittedly create necessity in an entirely 
different fact situation. As such, the decision of the district court on the eminent domain issue 
in this case should be reversed and remanded, with instructions to enter judgment in favor of 
the Cains on the trespass claim asserted by them in their Counterclaim. The decision of the 
district court in denying costs and attorney fees at the district court level should be vacated with 
instructions to consider the Cains' claim for fees under applicable Idaho case law. Attorney fees 
and costs on appeal should be awarded to the Cains. 



























RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of August, 2012. Nunc pro tunc. 
ROBERTSON &, SLETTE, PLLC 
~ BY: , GA YD. SLETTE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the 9th day of August, 2012 (nunc pro tunc), he caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the 
following manner: 
Robert 1. Harris [ ] 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC [x] 
P.O. Box 50130 [ ] 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130 [ ] 
[ ] 
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